The following is just a riposte to the following article that appears in the online edition of the Sunday Guardian on 22nd Mar 2014:
Really? How very convenient! Of course there is an element of truth with regard to the "Army brass". However, your article is misguided in that it seeks to highlight the most obvious symptoms instead of putting the spotlight on the root cause of the maladies in national security strategy and higher defence management. At that point in history, the move by the Government to delegate the responsibility for the war review first to the Ministry of Defence and further down to the military was a politically expedient and succeeded in shielding some of the key protagonists.
There is no doubt that many of the generals in the chain of command extending from the Army Headquarters down to the fighting formations were fully responsible for mismanaging a bad situation made worse not just by a decade of neglect of the armed forces post-independence, but for lacking the moral fibre to take a principled stand against the preposterous stream of instructions and the relentless pressure being put on them to implement a change in strategic posture - the Forward Policy. The generals even failed to buy the time needed to align resources and other military wherewithal to the imperatives mandated by the change in policy, and for allowing themselves, as you so eloquently put, to be "hustled into ill-prepared operations that could only lead to disaster".
But then, there is a catch, isn't it? How justifiable is a "timely" display of character and a refusal to implement instructions, however ludicrous, in the face of a belligerent enemy already knocking at the door? At best, you will be accused of being an obstructionist or even a coward. The immediate consequence of this sprightly approach would be a very public sacking, or at a minimum, an immediate transfer followed by the appointment of another more pliable general willing to toe the line. It is pertinent to say that, within the staid and tradition-bound military hierarchy itself, this is common practice.
But what if a politician begins to view his military advisor as inconvenient, obstructionist, someone who does not believe in toeing the line drawn for them, someone who counters a directive with an inconvenient demand for additional resources, or just as someone who is simply not pliable enough? Does it ring a bell? The Anthony-Joshi bell? The Anthony-VK Singh bell? The Fernandez-Bhagwat bell? There have been any number of instances where this clash of civilizations has happened in civil-military relations and not just in the past. Besides, in the years leading up to the war, "standard" military hierarchy had already been tampered with purportedly for the sake of increased efficiencies.
While the chain of events that led to the war may have been set in motion more than a decade before the war, the seeds of the disaster was planted during a very public spat in 1959 between Defence Minister Menon and General Thimmayya, the incumbent chief and one of India's most outstanding soldiers (the original Menon-Thimmayya bell?). Nehru did intervene to convince the General to withdraw his resignation only to humiliate him further by publicly berating and condemning him in parliament. Reduced to a lame duck, Thimmayya finally retired in 1961, handing over the reins of the Army to General PN Thapar, just 15 months prior to the war.
Was Thapar an inconvenient obstructionist? Probably not to the same degree as Thimmayya, but sufficiently enough for the MoD to scan the ranks seeking someone more agreeable, even if not necessarily qualified for the task at hand. Someone, who when asked to jump, would at best pause only to ask, "How high?".
That Gen Kaul got along with the establishment like a house on fire was obvious from the enthusiasm shown even by the likes of a foreign secretary to express opinions on the tactical locations of platoon posts. Surely, you may think, that was exactly what the great strategic theorist Clausewitz had in mind when he stated that "...war is an extension of foreign policy"?
For Defence Minister Menon war was "... a continuation of politics by other means" and therefore the primary qualification for generals selected to lead the Army was "loyalty" - not in the home and country sense, mind you, but to the minister himself.
For the generals, one key lesson of the war is the question of what approach to take when faced with the moral dilemma of taking a principled stand as a professional and resign or following the legally valid but incompetent instructions of a vindictive authority. In other words, whether to throw away the great honour normally associated with such high position and the trust reposed on him by his officers and men, or, to toe the line and go boldly down the path to hell for the sake of duty, honour and country.
The bottomline is that there are just too many valuable lessons to be learnt from the Henderson Report for it to be lying in a government locker. Once released, there is little doubt that it will become mandatory reading for all levels of the military hierarchy. However the most important learning will happen at the highest levels of government. And if that happens, it could well set into motion a chain of events that will change the fragmented, bureaucratic, lopsided and incompetent manner in which the political apparatus and the agencies responsible for the nation's security operate. Yes unfortunately, even today.
"The other unexpected revelation is that it's not the political leadership comprising Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and his favourite, Defence Minister Krishna Menon who are the principal culprits. Very surprisingly, it puts the onus for the debacle on the Army brass itself for disastrous leadership."
Really? How very convenient! Of course there is an element of truth with regard to the "Army brass". However, your article is misguided in that it seeks to highlight the most obvious symptoms instead of putting the spotlight on the root cause of the maladies in national security strategy and higher defence management. At that point in history, the move by the Government to delegate the responsibility for the war review first to the Ministry of Defence and further down to the military was a politically expedient and succeeded in shielding some of the key protagonists.
There is no doubt that many of the generals in the chain of command extending from the Army Headquarters down to the fighting formations were fully responsible for mismanaging a bad situation made worse not just by a decade of neglect of the armed forces post-independence, but for lacking the moral fibre to take a principled stand against the preposterous stream of instructions and the relentless pressure being put on them to implement a change in strategic posture - the Forward Policy. The generals even failed to buy the time needed to align resources and other military wherewithal to the imperatives mandated by the change in policy, and for allowing themselves, as you so eloquently put, to be "hustled into ill-prepared operations that could only lead to disaster".
But then, there is a catch, isn't it? How justifiable is a "timely" display of character and a refusal to implement instructions, however ludicrous, in the face of a belligerent enemy already knocking at the door? At best, you will be accused of being an obstructionist or even a coward. The immediate consequence of this sprightly approach would be a very public sacking, or at a minimum, an immediate transfer followed by the appointment of another more pliable general willing to toe the line. It is pertinent to say that, within the staid and tradition-bound military hierarchy itself, this is common practice.
But what if a politician begins to view his military advisor as inconvenient, obstructionist, someone who does not believe in toeing the line drawn for them, someone who counters a directive with an inconvenient demand for additional resources, or just as someone who is simply not pliable enough? Does it ring a bell? The Anthony-Joshi bell? The Anthony-VK Singh bell? The Fernandez-Bhagwat bell? There have been any number of instances where this clash of civilizations has happened in civil-military relations and not just in the past. Besides, in the years leading up to the war, "standard" military hierarchy had already been tampered with purportedly for the sake of increased efficiencies.
While the chain of events that led to the war may have been set in motion more than a decade before the war, the seeds of the disaster was planted during a very public spat in 1959 between Defence Minister Menon and General Thimmayya, the incumbent chief and one of India's most outstanding soldiers (the original Menon-Thimmayya bell?). Nehru did intervene to convince the General to withdraw his resignation only to humiliate him further by publicly berating and condemning him in parliament. Reduced to a lame duck, Thimmayya finally retired in 1961, handing over the reins of the Army to General PN Thapar, just 15 months prior to the war.
Was Thapar an inconvenient obstructionist? Probably not to the same degree as Thimmayya, but sufficiently enough for the MoD to scan the ranks seeking someone more agreeable, even if not necessarily qualified for the task at hand. Someone, who when asked to jump, would at best pause only to ask, "How high?".
That Gen Kaul got along with the establishment like a house on fire was obvious from the enthusiasm shown even by the likes of a foreign secretary to express opinions on the tactical locations of platoon posts. Surely, you may think, that was exactly what the great strategic theorist Clausewitz had in mind when he stated that "...war is an extension of foreign policy"?
For Defence Minister Menon war was "... a continuation of politics by other means" and therefore the primary qualification for generals selected to lead the Army was "loyalty" - not in the home and country sense, mind you, but to the minister himself.
For the generals, one key lesson of the war is the question of what approach to take when faced with the moral dilemma of taking a principled stand as a professional and resign or following the legally valid but incompetent instructions of a vindictive authority. In other words, whether to throw away the great honour normally associated with such high position and the trust reposed on him by his officers and men, or, to toe the line and go boldly down the path to hell for the sake of duty, honour and country.
The bottomline is that there are just too many valuable lessons to be learnt from the Henderson Report for it to be lying in a government locker. Once released, there is little doubt that it will become mandatory reading for all levels of the military hierarchy. However the most important learning will happen at the highest levels of government. And if that happens, it could well set into motion a chain of events that will change the fragmented, bureaucratic, lopsided and incompetent manner in which the political apparatus and the agencies responsible for the nation's security operate. Yes unfortunately, even today.
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